

MATH 314 - Spring 2018 - Class Notes

Alexander Stoyanov

03/27/2018

Recall SDES Feistel Cipher (3 rounds)

$$\begin{array}{lll}
 \text{Round 1:} & L_1 = R_0 & R_1 = L_0 \oplus f(R_0, K_1) \\
 \text{Round 2:} & L_2 = R_1 & R_2 = L_1 \oplus f(R_1, K_2) \\
 \text{Round 3:} & L_3 = R_2 & R_3 = L_2 \oplus f(R_2, K_3)
 \end{array}$$

Differential Cryptanalysis:

- Sort of like reverse engineering the system to recover the

Use Differential Cryptanalysis to attack SDES:

- Chosen Plaintext Attack
- Eve's goal is to recover K_3

Eve starts off with any plaintext L_0, R_0 . She encrypts this and gets L_3, R_3 .

She knows $R_3 = L_2 \oplus f(R_2, K_3) = L_2 \oplus f(L_3, K_3) \rightarrow R_3 = (L_0 \oplus f(R_0, K_1)) \oplus f(L_3, K_3)$

Now Eve picks a new plaintext L_0^* and R_0^* where L_0^* can be anything (different from L_0). But $R_0^* = R_0$ (only change left half of the plaintext).

She encrypts this plaintext and gets L_3^*, R_3^* .

$$\begin{aligned}
 R_3^* &= L_0^* \oplus f(R_0^*, K_1) \oplus f(L_3^*, K_3) & \oplus & & R_3 &= L_0 \oplus f(R_0, K_1) \oplus f(L_3, K_3) \\
 R_3 \oplus R_3^* &= (L_0 \oplus L_0^*) \oplus f(L_3^*, K_3) \oplus f(L_3, K_3) \\
 (R_3 \oplus R_3^*) \oplus (L_0 \oplus L_0^*) &= f(L_3, K_3) \oplus f(L_3^*, K_3)
 \end{aligned}$$

F-function:

$$L_3 \rightarrow [Expander] \rightarrow [E(L_3) \oplus K_3] \rightarrow [S_1, S_2] \rightarrow [Output]$$

Eve doesn't know output but she does know

$$output \oplus output^* = (R_3 \oplus R_3^*) \oplus (L_0 \oplus L_0^*)$$

She also doesn't know input, but

$$input \oplus input^* = E(L_3) \oplus E(L_3^*)$$

Ex: Suppose Eve is performing differential cryptanalysis and she ends up finding that

$$L_3 = 101110, L_3^* = 000010$$

She also computes that $(R_3 \oplus R_3^*) \oplus (L_0 \oplus L_0^*) = 100001$

$$(100001 = (output \oplus output^*))$$

$$[E(L_3) = 10111110] \oplus [E(L_3^*) = 00000010] = [10111100] \leftarrow input \oplus input^*$$

$$\text{first 4 bits of } input \oplus input^* = 1011$$

$$\text{first 3 bits of } output \oplus output^* = 100$$

Suppose $input = 0000 \rightarrow [S_1] \rightarrow 001 \leftarrow [output]$

$$input^* = 1011 \rightarrow [S_1] \rightarrow 010 \leftarrow [output^*]$$

$$[output] \oplus [output^*] = 011 \leftarrow (\text{wrong value, doesn't work})$$

Let's try $input = 0001 \rightarrow [S_1] \rightarrow 010 \leftarrow [output]$

$$input^* = 1010 \rightarrow [S_1] \rightarrow 110 \leftarrow [output^*]$$

$$[output] \oplus [output^*] = 100 \leftarrow (\text{This is what we wanted})$$

Repeat this for all 16 values of input, we find that only 0001 and 1010 are allowed.