MATH 314 Spring 2018 - Class Notes

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Summary: Various ways of attacking SDES through Chosen Plaintext Attack.

<u>Notes:</u> Differential Cryptanalysis of SDES: is a sort of reverse engineering of the cryptosystem to try to recover the key.

- 1. Eve is trying to recover K_3 -Picks L_0 and R_0 encrypts then gets L_3 and R_3
- 2. Now she picks a new plaintext L_0^* , R_0^* , L_0^* can be anything(different from L_0), $R_0^* = R_0$ (she picks the same right half as the first time)
- 3. $R_3 = L_2 \oplus f(R_2, K_2)$
- 4. $R_3 = (L_0 \oplus f(R_0, K_1)) + f(R_2, K_3)$
- 5. $R_3^* = (L_0^* \oplus f(R_0^*, K_1)) \oplus f(R_2^*, K_3)$
- 6. Add together:

(a)
$$R_3 \oplus R_3^* = (L_0 \oplus L_0^*) \oplus f(R_2, K_3) \oplus f(R_2^*, K_3)$$

- 7. Eve knows everything is this equation except for K_3
- 8. $(R_3 \oplus R_3^*) \oplus (L_0 \oplus L_0^*) = f(L_3, K_3) \oplus f(L_3^*, K_3)$
- 9. Eve does not know what output or output* from number 8. However, Eve does know what output \oplus output* is because it is equal to $(R_3+R_3^*)\oplus(L_0+L_0^*)$
- 10. $Input = E(L_3) \oplus K_3$
- 11. $Input^* = E(L_3^*) \oplus K_3$
- 12. $Input \oplus Input^* = E(L_3) \oplus E(L_3^*) + (K_3 \oplus K_3)$
- 13. $Input \oplus Input^* = E(L_3) \oplus E(L_3^*)$
- 14. $(K_3 \oplus K_3)$ Goes away because of the 'xor' operator which cancels out the same value.
- 15. Eve knows $Input \oplus Input^*$ and $Output \oplus Output^*$
- 16. Eve can try possible paris for $Input \oplus Input^*$ that sum to be the right value and see if they give the right $Output \oplus Output^*$

Example:

Lets say:

- $L_3 = 101110$
- $(L_3^*) = 000010$
- $(R_3 \oplus R_3) \oplus (L_0 \oplus L_0^*) = 100001 \ (Output \oplus Output^*)$
- $E(L_3) = 10111110$
- $E(L_3^*) = 00000010$
- $\bullet \ \mathrm{E}(L_3) \oplus \mathrm{E}(L_3^*) = 101111000 \ (Input \oplus Input^*)$

Try input = 0000

Then $input^* = 1011$

•
$$001 \oplus 010 = 010 ! = 100$$

Try input = 0001

Then $input^* = 1010$

•
$$010 \oplus 110 = 100 = 100$$