

MATH 314 - Class Notes

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Summary: Dixon's Factoring Algorithm, Discrete Logarithm(with Baby-step-Giant-Step), Index Calculus, Digital Signatures, DSA, Birthday Attack

Dixon's Factoring Algorithm:

Factor $n = pq$ much faster than naively.

Discrete Logarithm:


$$\beta = \alpha^x \pmod{p}$$

Solve for x .


Examples:

- 1st Attempt: Try all possible exponents.
Check if $\alpha^n \equiv \beta \pmod{p} \forall n \leq p - 1$
If p has 100 digits this is impossibly long.
- 2nd Attempt: Baby-step, Giant-step:
Given $\beta = \alpha^x \pmod{p}$, solve this for x .
Set $N = \lceil \sqrt{p} \rceil$
Create two tables:

Baby-steps



Giant-steps



Let's suppose c appears in both tables.

$$c \equiv \alpha^i \equiv \beta(\alpha^{-1})^{Nj} \pmod{p}$$

So, $x = i + Nj$

This requires $2\sqrt{p}$ steps, much faster than $p - 1$ steps.

Why does this work?

Suppose $\beta = \alpha^x \pmod{p} \forall x < p - 1 < (\sqrt{p})^2 \leq N^2$

Write x in base N

$$x = a + bN$$

Then let $i = a$, and $j = b$

c should show up in these tables at positions a and b respectively.

Index Calculus:

Index Calculus uses the same basic idea as Dixon's Factoring Algorithm.

Smooth Numbers: Only using numbers with small prime factors

Using this we get a running time of $O(e^{\sqrt{\ln(p) \ln(\ln(p))}})$

This means you want to use primes with ≈ 200 digits to be secure.

Digital Signatures:

Digital Signatures using the discrete log problem.

ElGamal backwards gives a way to sign messages used in practice

DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm):

Introduced by NIST in 1991.

Use two different prime numbers,

$p \gg q$, things are kept secure using p , but the arithmetic is $(\text{mod } q)$.

Setup DSA:

Pick q prime (160 bits).

Pick p to be a prime with about 1000 bits.

$p = aq + 1$, Need $p \equiv 1 \pmod{q}$

Let α be a primitive root $(\text{mod } p)$.

Let $\beta = \alpha^{\frac{p-1}{q}} \pmod{p}$. Note: $a = \frac{p-1}{q}$

Pick a secret $k \in 1 \leq k \leq q - 1$

Let $r = (\alpha^k \pmod{p}) \pmod{q}$

Alice's public key: (p, q, β)

Example:

Alice wants to use this to send a message m .

Compute $s = k^{-1}(m + ar)(\text{mod } q)$

She sends (m, r, s) , r and s together are her signature.

Bob wants to verify if Alice's signature is valid

Bob computes:

$$U_1 \equiv s^{-1}m(\text{mod } q)$$

$$U_2 \equiv s^{-1}r(\text{mod } q)$$

$$V = (\alpha^{U_1}\beta^{U_2}(\text{mod } p))(\text{mod } q)$$

If $V \equiv r(\text{mod } q)$, Accept Signature, otherwise, it is invalid.

Check that this works:

$$\text{Since } s \equiv k^{-1}(m + ar)(\text{mod } q)$$

$$sk \equiv m + ar(\text{mod } q)$$

$$m \equiv sk - ar(\text{mod } q)$$

Multiply both sides by s^{-1}

$$U_1 : S^{-1}, \text{ and } aU_2 : s^{-1} - ar$$

$$U_1 \equiv k - aU_2(\text{mod } q)$$

$$s^{-1}m \equiv k - s^{-1}ar(\text{mod } q)$$

$$k = U_1 + aU_2(\text{mod } q)$$

$$\text{Now, } r \equiv \alpha^k(\text{mod } q)$$

$$\equiv \alpha^{(U_1+aU_2)}(\text{mod } q)$$

$$\equiv \alpha^{U_1}(\alpha^a)^{U_2}(\text{mod } q)$$

$$\equiv \alpha^{U_1}\beta^{U_2}(\text{mod } q)$$

$$\equiv V$$

$$r \equiv V(\text{mod } q)$$

Birthday Attack:

Way to get what appears to be someones signature on a different document.

How many people do you need in a room before two share a birthday?

Suppose we had two people,

Probability that they don't have the same birthday is $1 - \frac{1}{365}$ or $\frac{364}{365}$

With three people: $\frac{364}{365} \cdot \frac{363}{365}$

In general, if we have k people, then the probability that no two people share a birthday is:

$$\frac{364}{365} \cdot \frac{363}{365} \cdot \frac{362}{365} \cdot \dots \cdot \frac{(365-k+1)}{365}$$

If $k = 23$, then this probability is: 0.497

$$\frac{364}{365} \cdot \frac{363}{365} \cdot \dots \cdot \frac{343}{365} = 0.497$$

If we have k people and n days in the year, then this is approximately $e^{-\frac{k^2}{2n}}$

Probability that no two share a birthday is $1 - e^{-\frac{k^2}{2n}}$ if k and n are large.