

MATH 314 Fall 2018 - Class Notes

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Summary: Basic strategy to decrypt SDES.

Differential Cryptanalysis: Released in late 80's, but was known to NSA much earlier.

- Chosen Plaintext attack:

Goal: Recover k_3

Recall S-DES:

Start with $\underline{L_0}, \underline{R_0}$ (Plaintext)

Step 1) $\underline{L_1} = \underline{R_0}$ and $R_1 = f(R_0, k_1) \oplus L_0$

Step 2) $L_2 = R_1$ and $\underline{R_2} = f(R_1, k_2) \oplus L_1$

Step 3) $\underline{L_3} = R_2$ and $\underline{R_3} = f(R_2, k_3) \oplus L_2$

NOTE: Eve already knows the highlighted ones

L_0 and R_0 are from chosen plaintext

L_3 and R_3 are from ciphertext

Because $L_3 = R_2$, Eve knows R_2

Eve wants to try and use this info to find k_3

We want to work backwards

$$R_3 = f(R_2, k_3) \oplus L_2 = f(R_2, k_3) \oplus (f(R_0, k_1) \oplus L_0)$$

Eve now encrypts a new plaintext: L_0^*, R_0^*

She keeps the right half the same: $R_0 = R_0^*$

But changes the left half

Out of the encryption comes a new ciphertext: L_3^* and R_3^*

$$R_3^* = f(R_2^*, k_3) \oplus \underline{f(R_0^*, k_1)} \oplus L_0^*$$

NOTE: $f(R_0^*, k_1)$ is same as $f(R_0, k_1)$

$$\begin{aligned} R_3 &= f(R_2, k_3) \oplus f(R_0, k_1) \oplus L_0 \\ R_3^* &= f(R_2^*, k_3) \oplus \underline{f(R_0, k_1)} \oplus L_0^* \\ &\oplus \text{Both sides:} \end{aligned}$$

NOTE: $f(R_0^*, k_1)$ was replaced by $f(R_0, k_1)$ b/c they are same

$$\begin{aligned} R_3 \oplus R_3^* &= f(R_2, k_3) \oplus f(R_2^*, k_3) \oplus f(R_0, k_1) \oplus f(R_0, k_1) \oplus L_0 \oplus L_0^* \\ R_3 \oplus R_3^* &= f(\underline{R_2}, k_3) \oplus f(\underline{R_2^*}, k_3) \oplus \underline{f(R_0, k_1)} \oplus \underline{f(R_0, k_1)} \oplus L_0 \oplus L_0^* \end{aligned}$$

R_2 becomes L_3 and R_2^* becomes L_3^*

Add $(L_0 \oplus L_0^*)$ to both sides:

$$(R_3 \oplus R_3^*) \oplus (L_0 \oplus L_0^*) = f(L_3, k_3) \oplus f(L_3^*, k_3)$$

Eve now has an equation where she knows everything but $\underline{k_3}$

However, S-Boxes were designed to make this equation hard to solve

It would be great for Eve if she knew the value of output = $f(L_3, k_3)$

Unfortunately for her, she doesn't know the output

$$\text{But she does know } \text{output} \oplus \text{output}^* = (R_3 \oplus R_3^*) \oplus (L_0 \oplus L_0^*)$$

Try to extract k_3 from the f function

Recall SDES f -function:

R_2 (is = to L_3) \rightarrow Expander $\rightarrow \mathbf{E(L_3)} \oplus \mathbf{k_3} \rightarrow S_1$ and $S_2 \rightarrow$ output

$$\text{input} = E(L_3) \oplus k_3$$

Eve doesn't know input because she doesn't know k_3

Her goal is to find input

$$\text{input} = E(L_3) \oplus k_3$$

$$\text{input}^* = E(L_3^*) \oplus k_3$$

$$\text{input} \oplus \text{input}^* = \mathbf{E(L_3)} \oplus \mathbf{E(L_3^*)}$$

Eve knows all that

Now Eve exploits the fact that she knows $\text{input} \oplus \text{input}^*$ and $\text{output} \oplus \text{output}^*$:
To restrict the number of things she has to check in the S-Boxes

Example: Eve has done all this and has found that:

$$\begin{aligned}L_3 &= 1011\ 10 \text{ and } L_3^* = 0000\ 10 \\E(L_3) &= 1011\ 1110 \text{ and } E(L_3^*) = 0000\ 0010 \\ \text{input} \oplus \text{input}^* &= E(L_3) \oplus E(L_3^*) = 1011\ 1100\end{aligned}$$

She also computes:

$$(R_3 \oplus R_3^*) \oplus (L_0 \oplus L_0^*) = 1000\ 01 = \text{output} \oplus \text{output}^*$$

1st 4 bits of input get fed into S-Box 1
Sum of the outputs is 100
Suppose the 1st four bits of input were 0000
Then the 1st four bits of input^* are 1011

$$\begin{aligned}S_1(0000) \oplus S_1(1011) \\ 001 \oplus 010 &= 011 \neq 100\end{aligned}$$

So the 1st four bits of input were not 0000

Try all 16 1st four bits of input:
Lets try 0001 is input, 1010 is input^*

$$S_1(0001) \oplus S_1(1010) = 010 \oplus 110 = 100 \checkmark$$

Both 0001 and 1010 work as the 1st 4 bits of input

CoCalc in class
Sage code for SDES Differential Cryptanalysis