

**Mission 6**

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Use the Sage code demonstrated in class to attack an SDES system. Do all of your work in the Mission 6 CoCalc Assignment files. (They will be collected as well.)

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**Part 1:** Use differential cryptanalysis to attack SDES (3 rounds).

You encrypt the plaintext  $P=[0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,0,1,1]$  and get the ciphertext  $C=[0,1,0,0,1,1,1,1,1,0,0]$ . In particular  $L_3 = [0,1,0,0,1,1]$  and  $R_3=[1,1,1,1,0,0]$ .

In order to attack the system, you also use several values for a second plaintext,  $P^*$ . The values of the plaintext, along with the ciphertext and the corresponding values of the xor of the inputs to the sboxes,  $(E(L_3) \oplus E(L_3^*))$  and the outputs  $((R_3 \oplus R_3^*) \oplus (L_0 \oplus L_0^*))$  are given. Determine the value of  $K_3$ .

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**First alternate plaintext:**  $P^* = [1,0,0,1,1,0,1,1,0,1,1]$

$$(E(L_3) \oplus E(L_3^*)) = [1,1,1,0,1,0,0,1] \quad ((R_3 \oplus R_3^*) \oplus (L_0 \oplus L_0^*)) = [1,0,0,1,0,1]$$

Possible values of input to Sbox 1 (From  $L_0$ ):

Possible values of input to Sbox 2 (From  $L_0$ ):

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**Second alternate plaintext:**  $P^* = [0,1,0,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1]$

$$(E(L_3) \oplus E(L_3^*)) = [1,0,0,0,0,0,1,1] \quad ((R_3 \oplus R_3^*) \oplus (L_0 \oplus L_0^*)) = [0,1,1,0,1,1]$$

Possible values of input to Sbox 1 (From  $L_0$ ):

Possible values of input to Sbox 2 (From  $L_0$ ):

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**Third alternate plaintext:**  $P^* = [0,1,1,0,1,1,1,1,0,1,1]$

$$(E(L_3) \oplus E(L_3^*)) = [1,1,0,1,0,1,0,1] \quad ((R_3 \oplus R_3^*) \oplus (L_0 \oplus L_0^*)) = [1,1,0,1,1,1]$$

Possible values of input to Sbox 1 (From  $L_0$ ):

Possible values of input to Sbox 2 (From  $L_0$ ):

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Conclude that the input to the Sboxes from the original plaintext was:

Input= \_\_\_\_\_ (Concatenate the remaining values for the input to Sbox 1 and 2.)

We can now recover the value of  $K_3$  by xoring this string with the value of  $E(L_3)$ :

$E(L_3)$ : \_\_\_\_\_  $\oplus$  Input: \_\_\_\_\_ =  $K_3$  : \_\_\_\_\_

**Part 2:** Use a meet in the middle attack to recover the two keys  $K_1$  and  $K_2$  used in an implementation of 2SDES (Double encryption with SDES) using 4 rounds.

First you encrypt  $P=[0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1]$  and get  $C=[0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0]$ .

- a. Use a brute force attack to find all possible values of  $K_1$  and  $K_2$ . How many seconds does it take?
  
- b. Use the Meet-In-The-Middle attack to find the same information. Are they the same as the ones you found by brute force?
  
- c. How many seconds did this take?
  
- d. Explain briefly why this was so much faster, how many encryptions does each method require? How many times faster would you expect a meet in the middle attack to be in this situation? (Recall, the keys have 9 bits...)

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Now you find that encrypting  $P^*=[0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1]$  with the same keys produces the ciphertext  $C^*=[1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0]$ .

e. Repeat the meet in the middle attack, and compare the pairs of keys you got using P and C to obtain the binary values of  $K_1$  and  $K_2$ :

f. Use the int2bin function to convert these numbers back into binary and record them here:

$K_1$ =\_\_\_\_\_

$K_2$ =\_\_\_\_\_