

MATH 314 - Class Notes

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Summary: Digital Signatures General Ideas

Hash Functions: They take a message and convert it into a much shorter digest (hash).

- $h: M \rightarrow S$

functions "h" should be harder to reverse, difficult to find "X" such that:

- $h(x)=y$

Collision Resistant: Hard to find two messages m_1 and m_2 $h(m_1) = h(m_2)$

Birthday Paradox:

Probability that 2 people in a room with "k" people share a birthday is:

$$1 - \frac{364}{365} \frac{363}{365} \frac{362}{365} \cdots \frac{366-k}{365}$$

If "k" = 23 then the probability is .503 In general if you have "n" things (1,2,3,...n) then pick 'k' at random (unlimited supply of each). Probability 2 are the same

$$1 - \frac{n-1}{n} \frac{n-2}{n} \frac{n-3}{n} \cdots \frac{n-(k+1)}{n} = 1 - e^{-\frac{k^2}{2n}}$$

- Digital Signatures

Used especially for:

Authentication: Bob can be sure Alice sent the message.

Non-Repudiation: Bob can prove to someone else that Alice sent the message.

- **1st. Idea:** Scanning a digital copy of your real signature and put it at the bottom of the message.

Need Signature and Message to be connected

One Method: RSA Backward

Like RSA Alice has (n,e) - Public Key

(p,q,d) - Private (Only Alice Knows)

Alice wants to send a message, 'm' to Bob

She computes $m^d \bmod n = S$

She sends (m,s)

Bob uses Alice's public key, he computes $S^e \bmod n$ checks to see if this is $= m \bmod n$

If it is Bob accepts the signature, if not he rejects it

Why does this work?

$$(S^e \bmod n = (m^d)^e \bmod n) = ((m^d)^e \bmod n = m \bmod n)$$

Why is it secure?

If Eve wants to pretend to be Alice she needs to be able to compute m^d , but this requires her to know Alice's private key.

General Idea of Signatures

Produce a signature using the message in a way that is only possible with knowledge of a private key. Want the signature to depend on the message in a way that can be verified using a public key.

- Set of Messages M
- Set of Signatures S
- Set of Keys K

Signature Function:

$$hk : M \rightarrow S$$

Verification Function:

$$V(x, y) = \dots \text{ True if } hk(x) = y$$

$$\dots \text{ False if } hk(x) \neq y$$

-El Gamal-

P - a large prime number
 α - Primitive root mod p
 a - Randomly Chosen in $(2,3,4,\dots,p-2)$
 $\beta = \alpha^a \bmod p$
 Public key is (P, α, β)

If Alice wants to sign a message 'm' using El Gamal.

Pick K randomly from $(2,3,4,\dots,P-2)$

Compute $r = \alpha^k \bmod p$

Compute $S = k^{-1}(m - ar) \bmod p - 1$

Signature is pair (r,S)

She sends (m, (r,s)) to Bob

To verify Bob computes

$$V1 = B^r * r^S \pmod P$$

$$V2 = \alpha^m \pmod P$$

Accept the signature if $V1 = V2 \pmod P$

Rejects Otherwise

Why does this work?

- $S = K^{-1}(m - ar) \pmod{P - 1}$
- $SK = (m - ar) \pmod{P - 1}$
- $m = (Sk + ar) \pmod{P - 1}$
- $\alpha^m = \alpha^s k + ar \pmod P$
- $(\alpha^a)^r * (\alpha^k)^S$
- $(B)^r * (r)^S V1$

Why is this secure?

If Eve wants to pretend to be Alice. She needs to obtain a value of S that is valid for Alice's secret key 'a' she needs an 'S' where:

$$\beta^r * r^S = \alpha^m \pmod P$$

$$r^S = \alpha^m * \beta^{-r} \pmod P$$

Eve has to solve this for S—DLP is Hard

—Digital Signatures—

DSA = Digital Signature Algorithm

Introduced by NIST in 1991

Pick q = a prime with around 160 bits

pick p = a(q+1) for some a around 1024 bits

pick g = primitive root $\pmod P$

pick $\alpha = g^{(p-1)/q} \pmod P$

pick $\alpha^a = g^{p-1} = 1 \pmod P$

—Steps for DSA—

1. Pick K randomly in (1,2,3...q-1)
2. Compute $r = \alpha^k \pmod P \pmod a$
3. Compute $S = k^{-1}(m + ar) \pmod q$

4. Digital Signature is (r, S)

—Verification—

1. Compute: $U1 = S^{-1}m \pmod q$
2. Compute: $U2 = S^{-1}r \pmod q$
3. Compute: $V = (\alpha^{U1}\beta^{U2} \pmod p) \pmod q$

If $V = r$ Accept; if otherwise, Reject

—Check That this works—

- $m = (SK - ar) \pmod q$
- $s^{-1}m = K - ars^{-1} \pmod q$
- $K = S^{-1}m + ars^{-1} \pmod q$
- $= u1 + au2 \pmod q$

—Now—

- $r\alpha^k = \alpha^{U1+au2} \pmod P$
- $\alpha^{u1} * (\alpha^a)^{u2} \pmod P$
- $\alpha^{u1}\beta^{u2} \pmod P$

Last step will only work if the Signature is Valid

—Key Improvement is...—

$(r, s) \leq q$ - Much smaller than P

Key arithmetic occurs $\pmod P$ large and so can be made secure using a large value of ' P '.

Since we want digital signatures to work for arbitrarily large messages 'm,' we can just use large messages; but it is better to use a hash function to make them short first instead.

In general we use a hash function to generate a digest $h(m)$, which is used to produce a signature instead,